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Abstract 
This study examines empirically whether corporate ratings by the credit rating 
agency Standard & Poor’s reflect fundamental and publicly observable shocks to 
the credit quality of companies. This serves to assess the degree of information 
sensitivity of external ratings, and the timeliness of their adjustments.  
Our evidence on a large sample of European companies from 2000-2008 clearly 
indicates that external ratings frequently do not reflect fundamental changes in the 
credit quality of companies. This lack of information sensitivity seems neither at-
tributable to private information from monitoring nor the rating-through-the-cycle 
approach employed by S&P.  
The intended regulation of rating agencies thus not only needs to validate the 
process of rating generation but needs to define the purpose and desirable charac-
teristics of ratings in the first place. The proposed methodology in this study, 
which is based on publicly observable capital market information, can help inves-
tors and regulators to validate external ratings.  
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“There are two superpowers in the world – the United States and Moody’s 
bond-rating service.“  
(T. Friedman, 1996) 
 
1 Introduction 
The recent subprime crisis in financial markets has raised severe doubts regarding the reliabil-
ity of ratings provided by credit rating agencies (CRA) like Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, or 
Fitch. Since credit rating agencies are pivotal,3 sometimes even described as the “gatekeepers 
of financial markets“, this has triggered strong moves towards an international and more strict 
regulation of these financial intermediaries.  
This study contributes to the discussion regarding the quality of rating agencies assessments 
by providing the first systematic empirical analysis, whether external corporate ratings are 
adjusted if they should be from an economic perspective. We define a set of publicly observa-
ble and severe shocks to the credit quality of exchange-listed companies and analyze, whether 
agency ratings change around these credit shocks, and how long a potential adjustment re-
quires.  
The study’s objective is unique, since to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that 
does not analyze the determinants of observed ratings or rating changes (Ang/Patel 1975,   
Blume/Lim/MacKinlay 1998), but rather focuses on the reverse question, whether a rating 
should have been changed.4 Furthermore, conditioning on credit shocks avoids some issues 
which could explain non-adjustment behavior but are difficult to assess from an outside pers-
pective.  In anecdotal case studies, often the observation of no adjustment is explained by the 
potential existence of private information by the CRA, or their adherence to the so-called rat-
ing-through-the-cycle approach.5 Rating-through-the-cycle mandates to change ratings only, 
if quality shocks are persistent rather than transitory in the light of the current business cycle 
(Löffler 2004). However, since we condition our analysis on severe credit shocks to compa-
nies, private information can hardly explain missing adjustments on average, and credit quali-
ty shocks are designed to be too severe to be assessed as only temporary. 
Our empirical analysis is based on the sample of European companies that were a constituent 
of the Dow Jones STOXX TM index at some time between the years 2000 and 2008. This cov-
                                                 
3 For example, the IOSCO states that “many investors and market participants effectively outsourced their valua-
tions and risk analyses to the [Credit Rating Agencies]”, IOSCO 2008a, p.2. IOSCO is an abbreviation for Inter-
national Organization of Securities Commission. 
4 Robbe/Mahieu (2005) is the study closest to ours. They show that a capital market based rating from the com-
mercial provider Moody’s KMV predicts changes in long-term issuer ratings by Standard & Poor’s. However, 
unlike to the focus of our study, they do not analyze the cases where the KMV rating predicts a change, but S&P 
does not adjust its corresponding rating.    
5 S&P defines rating-through-the-cycle as follows: „We attempt to avoid assigning high ratings to a company at 
its peak of cyclical prosperity, if that performance level is expected to be only temporary. Similarly, we may not 
lower ratings to reflect weakening performance because of cyclical factors, if the downturn is likely to be only 
temporary or there are good prospects for management to respond to the changed circumstances”, S&P (2008). 
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ers a base sample of about 1600 companies out of which about 460 were rated by Standard & 
Poor’s. We estimate a capital market rating for each of these companies based on the Merton 
(1974)-model. Since the Merton-type rating is well known to provide timely information on 
borrowers’ credit risk in conjunction with a high predictive power regarding firm default (see 
for example Bohn/Arora/Korablev 2005, Hillegeist et al. 2004, and Bharath/Shumway 2008), 
this capital market rating serves as our economic benchmark rating.  
We then define three different types of (publicly observable) shocks to firms’ credit quality 
based on the capital market rating, and test whether these shocks are reflected in the corporate 
rating by S&P. Our empirical findings clearly show that corporate ratings by S&P unreliably 
reflect severe shocks to corporate credit risk as assessed by the capital market.  
The study is organized as follows. In the second section we describe our data and provide the 
definition of the credit shocks used to validate S&P’s rating adjustment behavior. In the third 
section, we provide a systematic empirical test whether S&P ratings adjust to these credit 
shocks and present case studies on typical event firms. Finally, in Section 4, we discuss our 
findings and their implications for the current discussion on how rating agencies should be 
regulated in the upcoming “new financial market order”.  
 
2 Data, Capital Market Rating, and Credit Shock Definition 
2.1 Data 
The empirical analysis of this study is based on the sample of European companies which 
were a constituent of the Dow Jones STOXX Total Market index at some time during the years 
2000 and 2008. This constitutes a sample of about 1,600 large European companies, out of 
which about 460 were rated by Standard & Poor’s. We use annual and quarterly reports from 
Worldscope and stock price information provided by Datastream as our main information 
sources. Information on S&P long-term issuer ratings is also taken from Datastream.6 We use 
the period from 2000-2005 for calibration purposes, while the actual testing period starts in 
2006 and extends until March 25, 2009. The testing period covers the international subprime 
crises, which started in Europe at about July 2007 and has (as of mid 2009) not yet ended.7 
Companies without rating by S&P are required for comparisons and rankings in the cross-
section of our sample. 
We avoid a survivorship bias in the sample construction by tracing back all companies that 
were a constituent of the STOXX index since 2000. Still, the sample is a selection of large 
companies which might impose some selection bias. However, we do not believe this selec-
tion to materially affect our analysis, since in Europe, basically only large firms are rated by 
credit rating agencies in the first place, and firm size is correlated with public attention and 
                                                 
6 We rely on S&P long-term issuer ratings for maximum coverage of European firms and, most importantly, 
because these are unaffected by the LGD, i.e. the loss that occurs given a default, unlike the corresponding rat-
ings by Moody’s. Hence, at least theoretically, S&P ratings should closer resemble an estimator for a company’s 
probability of default, as does our benchmark rating based on the structural model by Merton (1974). 
7 For a description and analysis of the subprime crisis see Reinhart/Rogoff (2008), Hellwig (2009), and De-
myanyk/van Hemert (2009)  
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information production by investors, analysts and regulators. Analysing large firms thus en-
sures the availability of rated firms, a minimum level of available public information, and that 
reputation costs of false rating attributions by a CRA will be the highest. All of these features 
render our sample suitable for the intended analysis. Moreover, the reputation effect consti-
tutes stronger incentives for the agencies to quickly adjust their corporate ratings if credit 
quality of companies changes.   
 
2.2 Capital Market Rating 
The measurement of S&P rating adjustments requires a benchmark to assess the credit quality 
of firms independently from any CRA’s assessment. Due to the broad coverage of stock mar-
kets, the high frequency of price observations, and the evidence on the strong predictive pow-
er of ratings based on stock prices, we implement a capital market rating based on the struc-
tural by Merton (1974) in this regard.  
In particular, we estimate the so-called distance-to-default (DD) as our central measure for the 
credit quality of firms. The DD is defined as the number of standard deviations a firm’s asset 
value needs to change in order to hit the default barrier (in one year). We solve for each trad-
ing day and each company the central option-pricing equation (1), which relates the observa-
ble equity market value (the value of the call option of equity owners to buy the firm’s asset 
by repaying the debt outstanding) to the unobservable asset value and its volatility. We em-
ploy a numerically efficient iterative procedure to solve the one equation for the two un-
knowns, based on a rolling window of 250 trading days. Duane et al. (2005) show, that this 
iterative procedure corresponds to a maximum likelihood estimation of these parameters, im-
plicitly relying on the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm.   
(1)  
In equation (1), E denotes the market value of equity (the call price), D the nominal amount of 
debt due at time T, r the continuous risk-free interest rate, A the asset value, σA the volatility 
of the asset value, and N(.) the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distri-
bution. The term labeled d2 reflects the critical indifference point, where the equity owner’s 
call option will for the first time not be exercised, and thus reflects the probability of default 
of a company. Hence, (-) d2 is usually called the distance-to-default (DD), as illustrated by 
equation (2), where PD denotes probability of default.8  
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8 For the implementation, we assume that the debt due at time T, which is chosen to be one year, is a company’s 
total liabilities. Also, we calculate the DD under the risk neutral measure. We match balance sheet data to stock 
price information with a minimum lag of two month after the fiscal year end date, in order to avoid relying on 
information not yet available to investors. Altering these choices (increasing the lag, choosing short term debt 
plus half the long term debt as debt due etc.) does not qualitatively affect the results of our study.  
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Figure (1) illustrates the resulting DD estimated from firms’ equity prices and debt informa-
tion in our sample. The figure shows the development over time of the median and the 10th 
and 90th percentile of the DD of our STOXX firm universe (upper graph), and the correspond-
ing development of the STOXX equity price market index (lower graph). Clearly, the DD of 
these companies reflects the business cycle and has been significantly deteriorated with the 
beginning of the subprime crises in 2007. Note that lower values of the DD reflect higher 
probabilities of default.  
 
Figure 1: Time development of the DD compared to the DJ STOXX equity price index 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on our firm sample, comparing financial ratios and DD-
levels for several industries and at two points in time, before and at the subprime crises. 
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Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics  
The table shows descriptive statistics for our sample, consisting of constituents of the Dow Jones STOXX Total 
Market index at some time between 2000 and 2008. The table is subdivided into ten different industries (rows, 
according to the GICS classification scheme), and two points in time of our observation period: January 5, 2005 
and March 10, 2009. DD denotes distance-to-default, σ the standard deviation of the DD, ROE denotes return on 
equity (net income before extraordinary items / total common equity), Leverage is calculated as total liabilities / 
total assets. ROE and Leverage are reported in percentage points. All information from annual or quarterly re-
ports is matched to calendar time with a minimum lag of two month with respect to the fiscal reporting date, to 
avoid using information that was not yet available to investors.   
  
 Sample as of  January 2005 Sample as of  March 2009 
GICS Industry Share 
of 
Sample 
[%] 
DD 
[median] 
DD 
[σ] 
ROE 
[%] 
Leverage  
[%] 
Share 
of 
Sample
[%] 
DD 
[median] 
DD 
[σ] 
ROE 
[%] 
Leverage  
[%] 
Financials 21.76 6.14 2.70 9.49 76.55 21.81 1.19 1.39 11.12 76.71 
Industrials 21.54 6.35 2.42 3.31 66.06 21.41 1.65 1.13 21.25 65.76 
Consumer Discre-
tionary  17.36 7.00 2.50 11.15 57.33 15.74 1.91 1.35 12.41 62.29 
Information Tech-
nology 9.22 4.95 2.99 -9.61 47.71 7.37 2.42 1.38 13.92 47.91 
Materials 8.15 7.25 2.37 5.96 56.37 8.86 1.68 1.28 13.00 54.58 
Consumer Basics  6.32 8.81 2.71 17.49 61.58 6.08 3.00 1.19 22.62 59.63 
Health Care 5.90 8.88 2.78 5.47 45.38 6.77 3.93 1.45 12.45 51.60 
Energy, Equipment 
& Services 3.75 6.60 2.26 2.36 56.49 5.38 1.91 1.00 21.09 58.33 
Utilities 3.64 7.94 1.89 9.06 65.54 4.18 2.32 0.92 12.29 68.61 
Telecommunicati-
ons 2.36 6.70 2.44 -1.74 59.06 2.39 2.87 1.40 25.08 65.86 
 
From Table 1 can be seen that industry-specific DD levels have dramatically decreased with 
the subprime crises, although the effect is non-homogenous. For example, as to be expected, 
the financial sector is affected the most, with a median DD of 6.14 in 2005 decreasing to 1.19 
in 2009. In comparison, the health care and telecommunications sectors are the least affected 
by the general deterioration. The table also shows the shares of industries of the overall sam-
ple, where financial and industrial firms have persistently the highest share in the STOXX 
universe.  
Some results on the dynamics of S&P ratings are shown in Table 2, which also provides the 
number of firms in the sample (1591) and the number of firms with an S&P rating available 
(460). The table provides in particular results from a brief analysis of the association between 
changes in the distance-to-default and changes in S&P corporate ratings, conditioning on S&P 
changes.  
The analysis of Panel B in Table 2 serves to establish that there is some relationship between 
the DD and changes in the S&P ratings. Downgrades by S&P are associated with a significant 
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decrease in DD before the downgrade. The table shows that over the 30 days period before the 
downgrade, the DD decrease by a statistically significant 9% in the median (there was a fur-
ther reduction over the 30 days subsequent to the downgrade as well). DD changes before and 
after upgrades by S&P turn out not to be significant. These results are in line with the study 
by Robbe/Mahieu (2005), who show that the distance-to-default provided by the commercial 
vendor KMV can predict changes in S&P ratings.9 However, this type of analysis cannot 
show, whether S&P should have changed its ratings, which is the focus of our subsequent 
analysis of adjustments following severe shocks to firms’ credit quality.  
 
Table 2: External Rating Dynamics 
The table shows in Panel A the number of firms in our sample (overall and with S&P long-term issuer rating 
available). Panel B shows the frequency of observed downgrades by S&P (based on a 22-class rating scheme, i.e. 
treating +/- notches as a separate class). Panel B also shows the median DD at the day of an S&P rating change, 
and the median percentage change in the DD within a ± 30 days interval around the rating change. The signific-
ance of DD-changes is tested using a Wilcoxon rank test, where ***, ** denote significance at the 1%- and 5%-
level, respectively. 
Panel A: Sample Structure 
 S&P-Rating Overall 
No. of Firms 460 1591 
Panel B: Association between DD and S&P Rating Changes 
  Δ DD (30 days befo-
re) 
Median DD at rat-
ing change 
Δ DD (30 days 
after) 
Upgrades S&P   177  3.54 %  4.45 +0.49% 
Downgrades S&P  115 -9.01 % *** 5.73 -2.84 %** 
 
 
2.3 Credit Shocks used for Validation 
To assess adjustment behavior by S&P to credit shocks, we need to define credit events which 
constitute a significant and likely persistent shock to the credit quality of firms. Although such 
definitions are to some extent arbitrary, we think it is plausible that the following three events 
represent such shocks, in ascending order regarding the severity for the company. 
1. Instantaneous Shock: The default risk of a company increases significantly within a 
day. 
2. Non-Investment-Grade: The default risk of a company becomes too high to be con-
sidered as investment grade. 
3. Financial Distress: The default risk of a company is so high, that a company is in fi-
nancial distress. 
                                                 
9 We also conduct a more elaborate analysis using an ordered probit panel regression. Here, ordinal changes in 
S&P ratings (downgrade, stay, upgrade) are regressed on cumulative changes of the DD over different time in-
tervalls, the DD level, and year dummies. The results from this multivariate analysis are similar in that cumula-
tive decreases in the DD preceding the rating change by 30 days significantly explain rating downgrades.    
8 
 
We believe that all three situations characterize such severe and persistent shocks to the credit 
quality of companies that a corporate rating needs to be adjusted, even if the rating agency 
pursues a rating-through-the-cycle approach. To identify these situations using our capital-
market-based distance-to-default measure, we mostly rely on empirical calibrations based on 
the level of the DD and the percentile of the company in the cross-section of sample.  
The first situation of an instantaneous shock to the credit quality is measured by  
• a spontaneous reduction in the DD by at least 25% (which remains stable for at least 
10 successive days to avoid relying on outlier movements in the DD), and 
• a DD level of at most 4, to ensure an economically significant level of default risk. 
The second situation of a credit quality inconsistent with an investment grade status of the 
company occurs if: 
• the DD is for at least 20 successive days in the lowest quartile of the cross-section of 
all companies in the STOXX-universe, 
• the DD is numerically less than 2, 
• the company is rated at least “BBB-“ by S&P. 
This criterion is based on the in-sample characteristics of our sample firms before the actual 
testing period, i.e. from 2000 until 2005. A change in a company’s credit quality below an 
investment grade status is economically an important event, because many institutional inves-
tors are mandated (either by law or their own investment guidelines) to invest in investment 
grade assets only.10 Empirically, in our sample, the median DD of an investment grade com-
pany was 5.98, while the median was only 4.98 for non-investment grade firms. Also, the 
average percentile rank of a non-investment grade firms was 33%. Thus, if a firm is persis-
tently on a DD level of at most 2 and in the lowest quartile rank of all companies, it appears 
very likely, that one (i.e., S&P historically) would not consider it as being investment grade 
anymore.    
Finally, the third and most severe credit event occurs if a firm is in financial distress. Finan-
cial distress describes a situation where the default risk of a company is critically high such 
that stakeholders start engaging in restructuring activities. Note that financial distress typical-
ly precedes the initiation of legal bankruptcy proceedings. We measure financial distress as 
follows: 
• The distance-to-default is for at least 10 successive days less than 1.5, 
• The company is in the lowest 5% percentile in the cross-section of all companies in 
our sample. 
This distress criterion is again based on an empirical analysis, here for companies in Germa-
ny. Elsas/Hadder/Stein (2009) report that companies identified by this criterion comprise 
more than 85% of all German companies that subsequently went bankrupt (from 1990-2006), 
                                                 
10 Historically, the notion of investment grade status was generally used by regulators and banker to describe 
securities “safe enough” to invest in. Nowadays, investment grade is usually defined by an S&P rating of at least 
“BBB-“. 
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and in more than 70% of all cases restructuring activities such as management turnover, a 
change in ownership etc. occurred.  Moreover, the average DD of German companies that 
subsequently go bankrupt is 1.5 about one year before the announcement of the initiation of 
bankruptcy proceedings. Hence, the distress criterion is likely to identify firms that are in se-
vere financial trouble. Note that requiring a company to be in the lowest 5% percentile of the 
cross-section of all firms assures a relatively bad financial situation. Furthermore, the re-
quirement on the DD-level assures that only firms with an economically significant default 
risk are identified, because in boom times of the business cycle, even low ranked companies 
might have very high DD and thus a sound financial situation.  
 
3 Testing Rating Sensitivity to Credit Shocks 
General Description 
Table 3 shows the results from our rating sensitivity analysis, examining S&P responses to 
severe shocks in the credit quality of firms. The table differentiates between the three types of 
credit shocks, corresponding results are shown in the second (Instantaneous Shock), third 
(Non-Investment-Grade), and fourth (Financial Distress) column.  
From Panel A of Table 3, it can be seen that out of the maximum of 460 STOXX constituent 
firms with an S&P rating, 102 faced an instantaneous credit shock, 120 faced a credit quality 
inconsistent with an investment grade status (although investment grade rated by S&P), and 
55 firms entered financial distress. The second row in Panel A shows that the three shock sit-
uations are partly overlapping, because e.g. 22 out of 102 firms with an instantaneous drop in 
the DD also belonged to the group of firms categorized as financially distressed. Also, the 
fraction of companies facing the particular credit shock belonging to the financial sector is 
provided, with fractions ranging from 55% to 65% as an outcome of the subprime crisis. 
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Table 3: Credit Shocks and Rating Adjustment (2006 - March 2009) 
The table shows the frequency and other information for S&P rated companies where one of the three credit 
shocks „Instantaneous Shock” (at least a 25% DD deterioration, for at least 10 successive days), “Non-
Investment-Grade Status” (DD is in the lowest cross-sectional quartile, less than 2, for at least 20 successive 
days, firm is at least “BBB-“ rated by S&P), “Financial Distress” (DD is in the lowest 5% percentile, less than 
1.5, for at least 10 successive days) have occurred for the first time between 2006 and 2008.        
 Instantaneous Shock 
Non-Investment-
Grad Financial Distress 
Panel A:  All Rated Companies with Event  
No. event firms  102 120 55 
Thereof in financial distress 22 25 (55) 
Fraction of financials 55% 64% 65% 
Panel B:  Companies with Rating Change after Event 
No. firms (Fraction of  Firms With 
Rating) 42 (59%) 37 (31%) 24 (44%) 
Period from event until rating change 
[median] 254 days 170 days 175 days 
Panel C:  Companies without Rating Change after Event 
No. firms (fraction) 60 (59%) 83 (69%) 31 (56%) 
Thereof in financial distress 27 22 (31) 
Fraction of financials 62% 48% 71% 
S&P-Rating at last rating change  
[median] A-  A  A  
DD at last rating change [median] 4.92 5.10 4.03 
DD at event  [median] 1.75 1.89 1.19 
Period from last rating change to 
event [median] 616 days 641 days 859 days 
Period since event (final obs. Day: 
March 25, 2009) [median] 177 days 189 days 244 days 
 
 
Instantaneous Shock 
Focusing first on the group of firms that (for the first time) faced an instantaneous drop in the 
DD, from Panel B can be inferred that only 41% out of the 102 cases were subsequently asso-
ciated with a change in the S&P credit rating. Note that changes in the S&P rating here are 
defined as any change in the corporate rating, even if it is by just one “+” or “-“notch. Actual-
ly, the observed adjustment behavior needs to be further qualified, since the median time-span 
between facing the credit shock and a subsequent rating change is 254 days. 
In Panel C of Table 3 the (majority) subsample of event firms without S&P rating adjustment 
is described. In the median, firms facing an instantaneous shock to their DD were “A-“ rated, 
with a DD of 4.92 at the last rating change by S&P. After the instantaneous shock, the median 
DD level was only 1.75, which occurred in the median 616 days after the last rating change. 
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Finally, the last row of Panel C shows that since the occurrence of the shock, the S&P rating 
was (at least) not adjusted for 177 days in the median, such that the non-adjustment cannot be 
explained by having too short an observation period afterwards. 
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of one company facing an instantaneous shock to 
their credit quality, as measured by the corresponding capital-market rating based criterion. 
The figure shows the DD development of ArcelorMittal, a large steel manufacturer headquar-
tered in Luxembourg. Illustrating a typical pattern of a company being subject to an instanta-
neous shock to its credit quality, the DD-level of ArcelorMittal was fluctuating around a level 
of about 5 and slowly deteriorating since the third quarter of 2007, when in the first quarter of 
2008 the sudden deterioration occurred.   
ArcelorMittal was upgraded to the rating “BBB+” by Standard & Poor’s in November 2007, 
and only in June 2009 the rating was reversed to “BBB”.  
 
Figure 2: Development of the Distance-to-Default (DD) of ArcelorMittal  
 
Non-Investment-Grade 
The next group of event firms has a capital market rating inconsistent with an investment- 
grade-status. As described above, these firms have a DD of less than 2 for at least 20 succes-
sive days, belong to the lowest DD-quartile of the cross-section of all STOXX companies at 
each of these days, and are investment grade rated by S&P. Table 3 shows that out of the 120 
firms comprised in this event group, 37 had a rating change by S&P after 170 days (in the 
median). However, 69% of all cases didn’t have a rating change over at least the next 189 
days (in the median). As Panel C shows, the median event firm without rating adjustment has 
been rated “A” by S&P since 641 days, where the DD at the last change was 5.1. After the 
event (i.e reaching a DD-level inconsistent with an investment grade status), the median DD 
was only 1.89.  
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Figure 2 shows again a typical case study on firms in this event group. The graph shows the 
DD development of Fiat Spa, the well known Italian automotive company, and illustrates a 
steady deterioration of Fiat’s credit quality since the third quarter of 2007 (from the perspec-
tive of the capital market). About one year later, the DD and Fiat’s relative rank in the cross-
section became so low, that the company’s financial status seems not consistent with an in-
vestment grade status anymore. Still, Fiat’s rating by S&P has not been changed since April 
2008, where it was set to “BBB-“ (which is the lowest level of investment grade). In October 
2008, the outlook, however, was set to “negative”, but until March 2009, no downgrade oc-
curred.  
 
Figure 3: Development of the Distance-to-Default (DD) of Fiat Spa   
 
Financial Distress 
Finally, the group of event firms being in financial distress allows to analyze rating adjust-
ment by S&P for companies facing the most severe shock to their credit quality, as assessed 
by the capital market benchmark rating. Here, a company belonged to the lowest 5% DD-
percentile in the cross-section of firms, and the DD was less than 1.5 for at least 10 successive 
days. Although this constitutes a rather strict criterion for a having financial trouble, the ad-
justment pattern for S&P rating is similar to the other events. Only for 24 out of 55 companies 
did S&P change the corporate rating, which occurred in the median 175 days after the DD 
development fulfilled the distress criterion. Also similar to the other events, the actual obser-
vation period for companies without a rating change was 244 days in the median. This time-
span appears long enough to allow for the observation of any rating adjustment. This howev-
er, did not occur for 56% of these firms classified as financially distressed. 
From Panel C of Table 4 can be seen that the fraction of financial services firms is higher in 
the event group of financially distressed companies, due to the occurrence of the subprime 
crisis. Figure 4 provides another case study illustrating a typical credit quality development as 
measured by the distance-to-default. The figure shows the development of Commerzbank 
Q1-07 Q2-07 Q3-07 Q4-07 Q1-08 Q2-08 Q3-08 Q4-08 Q1-09
1
2
3
4
5
6
Non-IG
Calendar Time
D
is
ta
nc
e-
to
-D
ef
au
lt
13 
 
AG’s distance-to-default, where three days after the failure of Lehman Brothers in the U.S., 
the DD of Germany’s second largest commercial bank fell dramatically and remained even 
lower subsequently, on a level very close to zero. Not surprisingly, in November 2008 Com-
merzbank received state guarantees as supportive action by the government, and was partly 
nationalized in January 2009 to avoid bankruptcy.11  
At the same time, Commerzbank AG has been rated “A” by S&P since March 2007, and the 
outlook was changed to “negative” in September 2008. No further rating actions have been 
taken since. 
 
Figure 4:  Development of the Distance-to-Default (DD) of Commerzbank AG 
 
4 Conclusions and Implications for the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies 
This study contributes to the literature on credit rating agencies and financial market design 
by analyzing for the first time whether a CRA adjusts its corporate ratings to reflect funda-
mental credit shocks.  
The analysis of adjustment behavior of corporate ratings by Standard & Poor’s shows for a 
large sample of European firms, that these agency ratings very frequently do not reflect severe 
deteriorations or credit shocks to the credit quality of firms. We analyze instantaneous shocks, 
a financial status incompatible with being investment grade, and, as the most severe situation, 
companies entering financial distress. These categorizations are based on capital market rat-
ings (the distance-to-default measure from a Merton (1974)-model implementation) as a 
benchmark, thus reflecting publicly available but timely information mostly from stock prices.     
                                                 
11 The German government provided capital support of about 18 billion Euro, and received a 25% stake in 
Commerzbank shares in return. Actually, the overall market capitalization of Commerzbank was on January 2, 
2009 about 4.9 billion.   
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In these situations, S&P did not adjust its corporate rating in more than 50% of all cases at all. 
Moreover, even if any rating change actually occurred, this happened typically at a lag of 
more than half a year. In our opinion, this evidence constitutes a clear indication that CRA’s 
corporate ratings systematically do not reflect fundamental information on borrower’s default 
risk.12    
Naturally, this observed pattern of information insensitivity asks for an explanation. We have 
strived at setting-up an empirical design such that the examined credit shocks are too severe 
and persistent to be reasonably classified as temporary deteriorations. Hence, the observed 
lack of information in corporate ratings cannot be attributed to a rating-through-the-cycle ap-
proach by S&P. Moreover, since these events are publicly observable and very frequent, the 
lack of adjustment seems hard to be justified by any private information the CRA might have 
gathered, on average. This becomes particularly clear for the subsample of financially dis-
tressed firms, which consists of 65% of companies from the financial services sector. Our 
testing period covers the subprime crises and thus contains several banks that obviously came 
in severe financial difficulties, as evidenced by the significant supportive action programs set-
up by the governments around the world in 2008. S&P ratings do not reflect these shocks to 
the credit quality of banks, but it’s very unlikely that S&P had any better information on dis-
tressed banks’ bailout probabilities than other investors in the capital market. Hence, private 
information cannot explain the observed lack of rating adjustment. 
This leaves several other explanations be potentially relevant, however. It might be that cor-
porate ratings by rating agencies generally do not reflect fundamental information on compa-
nies. However, we do observe rating adjustments in about 45% of our events. Moreover, other 
studies show that market values of firms react to announcements of rating changes by CRA 
(Hand/Holthausen/Leftwich 1992, Krahnen/Hirsch 2007), and that rating changes can be ex-
plained by economically motivated determinants (Blume/Lim/MacKinlay1998). Hence, it’s 
too general a conclusion that external ratings never reflect information on borrower default 
risk. However, our study shows that they are at least very slow doing so.  
Another explanation is that rating agencies try to prevent so-called rating reversals, where a 
current rating (or rating change) is not conducted although fundamentally required, to avoid a 
reputational loss to the agency. Löffler (2005) shows that such a rating reversal avoidance 
could severely diminish the information content of ratings, potentially affecting information 
content more than monitoring credit quality of companies only twice per year.  
Finally, at least our results regarding banks could potentially be explained by the rating agen-
cies giving in to political pressure during the subprime crisis, not to downgrade bank ratings 
to avoid further destabilizations of financial systems. Of course, it is at least to be doubted 
whether such a behavior is desirable from an economic or a regulatory point of view.  
In the light of the current attempts to make credit rating agency regulation more stringent, our 
results provide important insights. First of all, the current debate focuses mostly on how to 
                                                 
12 We believe that our results based on S&P ratings carry over to the corresponding Moody’s ratings. In general, 
the migration probabilities for both CRA’s long-term issuer ratings are similarly low. Furthermore, we have 
verified that Moody’s rating responses are similar to S&P for a random selection of our event cases.  
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make remuneration for corporate ratings incentive-compatible, to avoid having firms paying 
for better ratings than fundamentally justified. This seems an important issue of rating regula-
tion, but the whole discussion up to now misses the issue what characteristics a desirable rat-
ing (from a regulatory perspective) should have. It appears natural to expect ratings to be re-
flecting actual probabilities of default for a given time period based on all available informa-
tion, but these features are not imminent to current corporate ratings by CRAs. This is already 
induced by the alleged filtering called rating-through-the cycle. But even more so, our evi-
dence clearly shows that ratings very frequently do not reflect even severe and likely persis-
tent shocks to the credit quality of borrowers.  
Hence, the intended regulation of credit rating agencies not only needs to validate the process 
of rating generation, it needs to define the purpose and desirable characteristics of ratings in 
the first place. 
Finally, our study contributes to the literature by suggesting a methodology to validate corpo-
rate ratings by rating agencies based on public information. Validation of credit ratings will be 
a crucial feature for future regulation. We propose to assess the credit quality of companies 
based on publicly available capital market information, and condition the analysis on severe 
credit shocks. This avoids discussing temporary fluctuations in the credit risk of companies, 
but nevertheless provides at least a starting point for regulators to analyze and discuss rating 
quality with the agencies.    
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